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THE UNITS OF INVESTIGATION IN THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES.
The opposition between the individual and society which,
on the practical side of human interest is as old as man’s his-
tory, has shown itself in recent years on the side of pure science
to be equally sharp and apparently equally irreconcilable.
When it became evident that Hobbes’ primitive individual
with his redundant independence was but a fiction of the
thinker’s brain; and when it was seen that Sir James Mack-
intosh’s dictum about the constitutions, that they &dquo; are
not made but grow,&dquo; must be applied as well in all other
fields of social phenomena, the students of society were not
satisfied with tempering the old theories to bring them
in accord with the real facts of human nature. They rushed
to the other extreme and set up as their entity, as their
unit of investigation, &dquo; Society &dquo; itself, in opposition to the
too presumptuous theories that based on the independent
individual. Thenceforward all explanations of the phenom-
ena of social life must be in terms of the social organism. We
learned that it was the &dquo; will of society &dquo; that declared war;
that it was the &dquo; social soul &dquo; that decided what was right
and what was wrong for the citizen. Finally, we have
theories that show how the social organism itself estimates
the values of goods as they appear in the markets; and
others that attempt to trace the course of religions almost as
if they were real beings with vital principles of independent
growth.
Now without having reference to the concrete content of
any of these theories, we cannot avoid feeling that as far as
they are expressed directly in terms of the social organ-
ism, they are rather to be looked upon as statements of the
problems to be solved than as themselves solutions. When
we are told that &dquo; society does so and so,&dquo; we are given
rather a description than an explanation of the phenomena.
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The social organism is not one of those units of experience
or hypotheses from which our reasoning can set out.
With these facts borne in mind we may begin a consider-
ation which will discover to us if possible what those facts
are which must be taken as our units of investigation if we
wish to understand the meaning of such phrases as those
given above.
First of all it is necessary to point out that very few
sciences are able to take as their units of investigation, ele-
ments which they are satisfied to regard as themselves irre-
ducible. The biologist, for example, must accept protoplasm
as a definite fact, behind which, for the present at any rate,
he is unable to go. Much as he desires to explain the life
phenomena connected with it, in terms of physics and chem-
istry, and many attempts as he has made in this direction, he
is baffled, and must begin his reasonings just with life itself.
There is a gap there which his interpretation of nature can-
not cross. The psychologist busies himself with the interpre-
tation of the nature and development of man’s psychical activ-
ities, but whatever theories he may cherish as to the connection
between the soul-life and the nervous system, there is much
in the former that he must simply take as it is given and
reason with as best he may.
The failure to realize this, the attempt to force an expla-
nation of the more complex phenomena in terms of the sim-
plest forces, and the transplanting of laws and methods found
satisfactory in one of these separated spheres of investigation
straightway to another, all lead to what Professor Patten
has well called the ‘ ‘ scientific bias &dquo; of investigation, and
bring in the end confusion instead of knowledge.
When we turn our attention to the social sciences we are
inclined to say at once that what they treat of is man and
his life in society, but if we should take simply individual
men as the units for our investigation and confine our atten-
tion to the direct interactions of one man with another, we
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would soon meet with very great difficulties. We would
find in the first place that we had omitted certain elements
of very great importance for the interpretation of social phe-
nomena, prominent among which is the physical environment
within which the men are located. Then we would be em-
barrassed by the fact that man is himself a variable factor,
great changes being produced in him by the very phenomena
under consideration; and an understanding of the reactions
of the social life on the individual would be vital to an
understanding of the social life itself.
It is nevertheless true, and in a deeper sense than a cur-
sory thought would indicate, that the human mind is the
central point tor all study of social phenomena; though our
next observation may seem to tend to a very different con-
clusion. For we must remember that the material that is
empirically given us in society to investigate is first of all,
simply motion; regular and irregular, temporary and perma-
nent changes of situation in both men and things. Motives,
desires, feelings, ideals, and all the other elements that go
to make up a conscious personality are not direct objects of
investigation for the student of society. Directly they con-
cern only the psychologist. Society itself is rather a nexus
of actio7zs; and it is a nexus so complex that were the inves-
tigator himself of other nature than human, its interpreta-
tion would be utterly impossible.
Fortunately we, coming as men to interpret the actions of
other men, are in better state. Gifted by inheritance and
accustomed by early training and by long practice on our-
selves and on others, in the little matters of daily life as in
the greater happenings, we are able to interpret the actions
of others in terms of the content of our own consciousness.
‘’4’e read into the lives of others motives and feelings akin to
those which we ourselves possess, and can thus use the con-
clusions of psychology to explain the phenomena that would
otherwise baffle us.
This process of interpreting physical phenomena in terms
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of psychic elements must be recognized as fundamental to
any attempt to understand society; and, indeed, it is so uni-
versally employed as to make it seem commonplace in state-
ment. It is a much more common error to consider the
phenomena to be explained themselves psychical, than to
assert their causes to be physical.
It is true that as far as our experience of live, socially
active human beings is concerned the two kinds of phenomena
are never separate; or, better said, the physical man always
shows signs of those co-ordinated activities, which we inter-
pret as involving the presence of what we call the psyche.
The fact is better stated in this latter form, because what one
man observes in other men is of necessity only the physical,
the outer series; it is in himself alone that he can attend
both to inner and to outer series.
In order to find a firm basis for our interpretation from
psychical to physical, we are forced now to further considera-
tion of the relation existing between the two series. It is
evident that no thought on this subject can start except from
hypothesis. One possible assumption is that mind and mat-
ter are two entirely disparate substances, and that the former
is able directly to exert influence on the latter. By such an
assumption, however, an unknown and indeterminable ele-
ment, mind, is introduced into our reasonings, and that
means the sacrifice of all hope of scientific explanation of
society. Opposed to this is the usual hypothesis of nearly
all modern philosophy and science, that the two series, the
physical and the psychical, correspond to one another
throughout. We will make here the ordinary scientific
assumption that the two series are simply different aspects
of the same substance; put in plain words that means for us
simply that mind has its laws as does matter, and that, in
human beings at least, the phenomena of one regularly
accompany the phenomena of the other.
When it was said above that physical phenomena were to
be interpreted in terms of psychic elements, it was not
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meant to imply that one series influenced or caused the
other. The meaning was that where our ability to follow
the physical or sense-series ceases on account of its com-
plexity, there we must interpolate, according to our daily
custom, and with the aid of psychology, such elements
drawn from our own consciousness as experience has shown
to be most satisfactory in explanation.
Let us look for a moment at the physical series. Every
motion or action implies of necessity an environment within
which it occurs. There can be no change of place without
reference of the thing changed to the other things which con-
stitute its environment. There are however certain portions
of the environment which stand in a more intimate relation
to the given object; for the movement of the object is always
directly referrible to some preceding movement in a portion
of its environment, and it will always be followed sooner or
later by other movements in the environment. This is noth-
ing more than the general principle of causation. It must,
however, not be forgotten that these objects of the empirical
world which so react and are reacted upon are themselves of
complicated nature, having individual characteristics due to
previous processes of physical, chemical or vital character.
Each possesses its specific way of reacting and of causing
reactions. The same blow or strain applied to a steel rod,
or to a stick of glass or of wood, will have very different
effects in the different cases. The jackass and the cat have
very different reactions when placed in a patch of thistles.
Even different men vary greatly in their response to the same
stimulus, indicating thus the specifically varying character
of their organisms.
Each of those actions, then, which taken together make
up what we call the social phenomena, may be looked at
from two directions. It may be considered first from the
position of what we call the actor, and second from the posi-
tion of the environment, or that which has been acted upon.
Let us now turn from the physical to the psychical aspect
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of the phenomena. As has been shown above the attempt
to explain the physical processes of society by means of
psychical elements rests upon the hypothesis that the two
series correspond to one another throughout. It is true that
immediate physical reaction with the environment, of a kind
which has never appeared directly in the consciousness of
the organism, is responsible for very much of the physical
evolution of the human being. The study of these reac-
tions falls however rather to biology than to sociology. Man
as the result of these reactions is a primary assumption of
the sociologist. It is true, further, that many of the actions
of an individual man living under social relations, are reflex,
and consequently do not appear in the corporate conscious-
ness of the individual. Their corresponding psychic side,
if existent at all, must be located in the lower, sub-cortical
centres. Such actions are however in nearly every case
strictly personal ones and without importance for the study of
social phenomena. The statement will therefore hardly find
contradiction that all the human actions which the sociologist
is called upon to consider have their correlates in con-
sciousness.
Since, then, we have found on the physical side that all
the phenomena of movement can be looked at from two
standpoints, which have been indicated by the opposition of
actor and environment, we would naturally expect a similar
relationship on the psychical side. And indeed we can make
such an analysis in thought; it is the relationship of subject
and object itself. We waive the speculation, which fortu-
nately does not concern us here, as to whether this relation
is also found in the inorganic world; the physicist does not
use it, finding that interpretation in terms of the physical
series is sufficient for all his needs. It is just in the phe-
nomena of human life that the relationship is universally
admitted to exist. Subject and object are the results of the
very first analysis of what we call the psychic, and one of
them is inconceivable without the other.
 at NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIV on April 22, 2015ann.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
93
We must now carry farther the analogy between actor and
environment, or cause and effect, on one side, and subject
and object on the other. If we consider for itself the
simplest psychic state which we can find-a pure sensation,
whether pleasurable, painful or indifferent in tone-it is prob-
ably correct to say that it is just &dquo; a piece of naive experi-
ence 
&dquo; 
with neither subject nor object about it. But enough
’ philosophizing &dquo; has been done by every adult, even of
the lowest savage tribe, to give him this analysis into subject
and object; and the distinction, once made, becomes a tre-
mendously important thing. The man as subject feels, and
he feels with reference to an outside world. This process
of &dquo; localization &dquo; may be very vague indeed as where a
slight disturbance is located in general among the viscera; or
it may be very precise, as is the ordinary man’s idea of
place of things seen. Among adult members of society, it
is, however, always present.
Now just as man on the physical side is a living and
’’ going ’’ organism with his own peculiar modes of reaction,
so he is to be considered on the psychical side. The adult
man has a great store of experience, and this determines the
specific modes of his psychic reaction. The combination of
a physical stimulus with his nervous structure, resulting in
action, and the combination of a sensation with his ideas,
resulting in a new state of consciousness, are simultaneous.
It is on the basis of these propositions, resulting as they do
from our preliminary hypothesis of the relation between
matter and mind, that we get our justification for explaining
the physical phenomena of society in terms of psychic ele-
ments. Instead of attempting to interpret the actions of
men by brain states, of which in the very nature of the phe-
nomena we can know nothing, we use directly the concomi-
tant psychic states, the desires, feelings ’and ideas, and
interpret the actions through them. Empirically we have
seen this method of explanation to be unavoidable; and the
hypothesis from which we have set out is the only one which
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will enable us to take advantage of it, and yet keep within
the limits of scientific work.
Now it is so clear as hardly to need statement that the
analysis between subject and object is possible only for an
individual consciousness. One’s own subjectivity is the one
absolutely unique fact of his life. In assuming for each
individual man a psychic life, that is an individual subjec-
tivity, we assume for him at the same time the corresponding
object series to which his subject refers. This object series
will vary greatly for men at different stages in racial evolu-
tion. It will differ for two men under the same circumstances;
and it will even differ for the same man at different periods
in his intellectual development. If then we are to interpret
the individual’s actions by means of his assumed subjective
states, we must understand and interpret these with reference
to the particular individual object series to which they refer,
as far as we can determine it, and not with reference to our
own, or to some assumed &dquo; racial &dquo; or &dquo; social &dquo; object series.
If the elements on which we base the explanation of society
are to be the states of feeling and knowing of the individual
subject, they must have opposed to them the content felt and
known by him at the time, rather than that content of better
tested knowledge which the race has accrued, and which we
are accustomed to call the &dquo; real &dquo; physical world. This
may seem rather a verbal quibble. It has, however, its im-
portance in the consideration of the complicated phenomena
of society, and we shall be careful throughout to name the
elements that we may find, rather in terms of subject and
object than of physical forces.
The postulation of these mutual interactions of the phe-
nomena in the psychical as well as in the physical series,
must not be thought to be derogatory in any way to the
power of initiative which manifestly resides in all living
beings. Rather it directly presupposes it. Just as proto-
plasm becomes a store of energy, and as the different organ-
isms all have their characteristic acquired modes of reaction,
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so there is for each being its characteristic psychic condition
and initiative. And though we can ultimately reduce the
‘ 
‘ going &dquo; and originating power of protoplasm to reaction
of units of matter with the environment-as it has been sug-
gested, for example, in the case of the simplest unicellular
organisms, to the effect of moisture and light on the surface
of the cell-this does not in the slightest degree do detriment
to the fact that in the organisms as we find them, the specifi-
cally characteristic activities and &dquo; psychologies&dquo; are present.
Admitting the necessity of a psychologic interpretation of
all social phenomena, and recognizing that just as every
action is only conceivable with reference to an environment,
so every psychic state whether feeling or thought or impulse,
is inextricably bound up with an &dquo;object,&dquo; either of the
past or of the present, to which it can be referred, we are in
a position to begin the consideration of those elements which
must be made the units of investigation in any causal inter-
pretation of social phenomena.
The elements divide themselves as has been indicated,
first of all, into the two general classes of the men who know,
feel, and act, and that content which presents itself from
one point of view as that which is known or felt, from the
other as that which is a cause of action. Any individual
man, as we find him, has certain characteristic ways of
reacting on the various stimuli that are presented to him.
The sum of these forms of reactions, considered from the sub-
jective side, constitute what we call his personality, and dis-
tinguish him from other individuals. The sensations which
present themselves to him from without, combine themselves
as they come, into percepts or objects. To these he responds
in accordance with his accumulated store of ideas, or psychic
personality, as above described.
These objects group themselves primarily into other human
beings, and a physical nature, which latter phrase must be
understood to include brute and vegetal life as well as
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inorganic phenomena. It must not be left out of account that
man is a &dquo; going &dquo; organism; and that what both immediate
sense stimuli and his store of accumulated experience or
personal knowledge really do for him is to control the direc-
tion of his actions. Consequently he sometimes seems to be
acting entirely under the influence of immediate sensations;
sometimes entirely under the influence of inward states or
ideas. In reality both elements are concerned in all his
actions. The actions brought about largely by inward states
or ideas become exceedingly complex. It is on them almost
entirely that social life depends, and it is on account of their
complexity that we are forced to the psychic interpretation
of the social phenomena.
In classifying the units of investigation in the social
sciences we do not need to do it from the standpoint of the
individual man in society. It will suffice if we remark that
th’; actions of each individual with reference to his neigh-
bors are governed by what he expects them to do rather
than by what they actually will do, as to which latter the
individual man has of course no means of being certain in
advance. The classification can then be made from an
external standpoint.
The units of investigation then, as far as they have been
yet mentioned, include the knowing and acting men, and
the known environment of physical nature within which they
are placed. With the latter we have in this paper little con-
cern. It consists always of certain concrete conditions;
and, as has been repeatedly said, is to be brought into
consideration only in so far as it is known to the members
of the society. In low societies the influence of this envi-
ronment while of the greatest importance, is simple and
largely a matter of immediate experience. The conditions
of climate, the dangers that are encountered, the food supply
that is within reach, are all reacted upon directly and have
their great effect in social development. In an advanced
type of society where a great mass of knowledge has been
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acquired by the summed up labors of many generations of
men, and where the various parts of the external world are
understood in their relations to one another, the environ-
ment is exploited to a much higher degree for the benefit
of the individuals. Nature is here under the control of man,
and the individual’s reactions with it are in the main not
direct but meditated through the organization of society,
and through the whole mass of accrued appliances and
social knowledge.
Passing now from the physical environment to the human
beings who react in connection with it, it is next neces-
sary to classify the various psychical elements with ref-
erence to the forms which they assume under social con-
ditions. For the sociologist the fundamental fact of the
psychic life of man is that he is a creature with wants. The
term wants may be understood to include the content of all
those motives which lead to action with which the sociolo-
gist is concerned; there are, of course, many other wants
leading to actions which have no import for society. We
may distinguish in general between the deep-seated and
permanent needs of the organism, and its temporary and
fluctuating desires; but it is not the purpose of this paper
to concern itself at all with the classification of concrete
wants. While such classification is of the utmost importance
for the interpretation of specific social problems, it will not
aid to discover the general types of elements with which one
must always reckon. We must seek rather for the specifi-
cally different psychical forms in which the wants, and the
psychic processes connected with their satisfaction, express
themselves. We will find, in general, three such forms which
are of importance to the sociologist. The simplest of these
is impulse, which is correlated with impulsive action. It is
an immediate yielding to the first best desire that comes along.
We may define impulse accordingly as the psy chic analogue
of the simplest form of want satisfying activity; remember-
ing of course that with the increasing complexity of psychic
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life, and the consequent conflict of impulses, there will be
many impulses which will be conquered by stronger ones,
and so which never appear directly in action. In the lower
animals the form of much of the activity from birth onward
is instinctive, by which is meant simply an inherited form of
reaction on the world; but in the human being instinct plays
such a minor role, being replaced almost entirely by imita-
tion and acquired experience after birth, that we do not need
to take it into account for our purposes.
Simple impulsive actions being random and indefinite are
themselves of little importance for the sociologist, and in the
vast majority of persons in a modern civilized community
they occur mainly in connection with the trifling personal
functions of every day life. In place of them we find the
co-ordinated actions governed either by custom or by &dquo;en-
lightened egoism.&dquo; It is next necessary to trace briefly the
steps in this co-ordination of impulses into customs on the
one side and into &dquo;competition&dquo; or conscious calculation on
the other
Even in an isolated individual there would arise very
quickly habits of reaction, owing on the mental side to his
distinguishing between successful and unsuccessful methods
of attempting to satisfy his wants; and on the physical to the
tendency to repetition of past actions, the energy of the
individual being drained off along the lines of least
resistance. In a group of individuals living under the same
physical surroundings, there would naturally be many
habits individually formed which would correspond in all
the members of the group. Recent investigations have
greatly emphasized the importance for the understanding of
the evolution of mind, of the imitative tendency in all its
various stages from physiological repetition to conscious and
*Professor Patten has elaborated the distinction between actions determined by
&dquo; feeling and those determined by &dquo; reasoning&dquo; in several of his recent writings.
See especially &dquo;The Scope of Political economy,&dquo; Yale Review, November, t893
P. 279.
t Compare, for example, J. Mark Baldwin, &dquo; Mental Development in the Child
and the Race,&dquo; &dquo; New York, 1895. 
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volitional reproduction; and this factor alone would be suffi-
cient to ensure a great multiplication of the number of habits
of action common to most or all the members of the group.
Habits of quite complicated character would be passed both
from parents and from other adults to the children, as well as
from adult to adult.
In this approximation of the habits of many people to one
another we have the rudiments of customary action, a
phenomenon of such transcendent importance for the inter-
pretation of many civilizations, and of the widest influence
even in the Western civilization of to-day. Imitation, im-
portant as it is, can however explain to us by no means all of
the phenomena of social custom. As a correlative to the at-
tempt both of children and of adults to acquire consciously
and volitionally some social habit or custom, there may go
the attempt on the part of the more adept to impart or teach
it. The custom thus comes to be looked upon objectively
from both sides. It is referred to the whole group as some-
thing which everyone does, and no longer regarded as a
simple property of the individual. When it is learned or
taught it is looked upon as something to be valued for its
own sake. In the characteristic way peculiar to the human
species, the means has been raised up and is treated as an end
in itself.
But this is not all. After the custom has become compar-
atively fixed and rigid, the physical environment, or the
corresponding wants of the group, may undergo some
change, so as to destroy to a greater or less extent the pur-
posefulness of the custom. It will not readily yield and
remains a monument of past conditions. It becomes then
regarded all the more as objective and independent. The
more intelligent of the people may see its undesirability, and
wish to disregard it, but lack of energy and fear of their less
facile fellows will keep them true to the old observance.
Again, in the course of time and with a changing environ-
ment, the custom may come to affect an entirely different
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part of the life activity from that which it originally con-
cerned : and this is still another element tending to cause
people to look upon it as an objective fact with which they
must reckon.
Now in order that these customs be looked on as objective
by the individual members of the group in which they are
found, a considerable degree of intellectual development is
required. The individual must have consciously reflected on
the surroundings of his life and be able to reason about them.
It is just this characteristic which marks the sharp difference
between the actions of the hive-bees and those of the members
of even the most savage group of human beings. It will
hardly be said that the worker bee consciously reflects on his
life and its conditions, and acts accordingly. The bee
simply acts as his instincts have led him, and all is well.
The man reflects as he lives. It is not intended to claim
that in races under the full sway of primitive custom, there
is very much conscious reflection of this particular kind, but
simply that in an occasional individual the germs of it are
found, and that the farther the tribe has developed, the more
important such reflection becomes.
We have seen that many of the impulses and habits of
the individuals become co-ordinated in social life in the form
of custom. There remains, however, a large part of their
activity which does not become so regulated but continues in
the impulsive form. It is probably here that the material is
to be found from which free volitional action and conscious
calculation of utilities is developed. The occasion of such
action would be, as has been already indicated, the conflict of
two or three impulses of which it was possible to choose only
one. A utility scale would gradually be formed in accordance
with which choices would be made. The portion of the
activities of the individual in connection with which such
conscious calculations are made, would be gradually enlarged;
but it is evident that only that can be weighed and estimated
which is of the nature of a content of knowledge; and this
 at NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIV on April 22, 2015ann.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
I0I
agrees thoroughly with our general theorem of the importance
of the opposition of subject and object, in selecting our units
of investigation.
We may now pause for a moment to consider what ele-
ments on which to base our reasoning about social phenom-
ena, have been thus far disclosed, and what are their relations
to one another. These elements are individual men as
acting ( i ) on impulse, (2) unreflectingly, in accordance with
custom, or (3) with conscious calculation. Their actions are
governed with respect to their environment, which consists,
for all their calculated actions, at least, of their knowledge
and experience of (a) nature, (b) their fellow-men as indi-
viduals, and (c) social customs.
In making thus social custom, as we find it objectified
in the mind of the individual, one of the units for reason-
ing, it is by no means meant that custom is any mate-
rial or tangible phenomenon. The ridiculousness of such a
position is apparent enough. On the other hand more is
meant than that it is simply an abstraction made by the
student to help him in his scientific studies. Custom must
be understood as objectified in the minds of the very people
among whom .it is found, and .as helping to regulate their
actions. True, in low, custom-bound societies there may be
very few who do more than imitate, very few who consciously
take custom into account in the way we have specified.
Nevertheless there are some who do it, and whose lives are
greatly affected thereby; and it is these very individuals
who bear with them the seeds of social change, and whose
natures it is thus of the most importance for the sociologist
to understand.
The elements thus far enumerated are clearly insufficient
to account for many of the highly complicated phenomena
which we find in modern social life. We have however
already attained the main principles on which their classifi-
cation must be based : so instead of trying to follow further
the general course of social development, we may descend at
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once into the midst of affairs as our present society shows
them.
First of all our attention is called to the fact that the
physical environment to be considered is no longer simple
unmodified nature. By the actions of many generations of
men, climates have been changed, lands reclaimed, harbors
made, and a thousand other changes brought about in the
country inhabited. We must take all these things as we
find them now if we would understand society rightly. Fur-
ther than this, a modern society possesses a great store of
material goods which have already been fitted for human
use, or are on their way toward that goal. These form a
vantage point for further progress. These material elements
admit only of concrete classification, and, as before, we
can pass over them at once to the distinctively human
elements.
It will be remembered that the chief characteristic of cus-
tom is that it is a form of action which is shared in alike by
all, or, at least, by the great majority of the members of the
group in question. Undoubtedly the chief form of custom
which we have to mention is the language of the society. In
its earlier forms, spoken language will be found to answer
very exactly to customary action as it has been described
above. Under custom may also be classed simple religious
beliefs, and even simple ceremony, as far as it has not taken
on a type of organization characterized by formal division of
labor.
Unfortunately the word custom is liable to be understood
in several different ways. It may mean first of all, on the
physical side, the habitual mode of reaction which is the
same in all of the individuals of the group. This we have
been distinguishing by the phrase &dquo; customary action &dquo;
instead of by the simple word custom. But it may also
refer subjectively to the characteristic of the individual in
making such response to stimulus: or finally it may mean
the objectified mass of custom as it presents itself to the
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reflecting individual: in other words, the abstraction, cus-
tom. Customs in this last sense are the prodÙc!s of the
social interaction of men, as recognized in the individual
brain. Now there will be found certain other elements in the
knowledge of the individual about society, which differ in
certain respects from customs, and which are even more
important as regulators of his conduct. These bear in gen-
eral the mark that they involve differentiation of function on
the part of the individuals: and they are often classed
together with customs under the general phrase ‘ ‘ social
structure. &dquo; Here belong, for example, all institutions, and
the whole social organization of individual activities. The
general characteristics of any particular civilization are often
summed up by reference to these things-its laws and insti-
tutions, customs and beliefs. There is apparently no dis-
tinctive English word for this class of phenomena, and as it
is essential for the sake of clearness of reasoning to have
them specifically named, we may perhaps adopt from another
science the word ‘‘ formation &dquo; ’for this purpose. Formafion
then may be used to designate any portion of what is often
called the &dquo; social structure,&dquo; whatever its origin, which
may be objectified by the individual and made the norm or
basis of his action.
Prominent among the social formations is the state, or
rather the constitution of the state, if that word can be used
in such a broad sense as to make it include the form of
organization of all the political activities of that part of the
citizenship which is concerned in any way whatever with the
carrying on of the state functions. Again the whole religious
organization with its related institutions forms a good exam-
ple of a social formation, or rather of a complex of such
formations. Here also are to be ranged such institutions as
marriage and the family, the school and the university, and
benevolent organizations. The industrial organization of a
modem society is a complex of such formations, among
which may be mentioned the phenomena of exchange, credit,
r -
 at NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIV on April 22, 2015ann.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
I04
currency, the transportation system, boards of trade, banks,
the telegraph, and business law.
Objection may perhaps be brought that these &dquo; social for-
mations &dquo; are really nothing more than modes of interaction
of men living in the society of one another, and that
abstraction of them does.not make them elements of reason-
ing, but rather phenomena to be explained; and it may be
said further that the explanation can be given completely in
terms of the individual men who are members of the society
in which the phenomena occur. The first of these points is
readily admitted, but the second and third imply misunder-
standing of the whole course of our argument. It has been
a fundamental assumption from the very beginning of this
paper that the actions of men, which are the phenomenal
content of sociology, are so complex that they can be ex-
plained only in terms of the psychic lives of those men.
Further it has been assumed that the psychic factors can only
be understood in connection with that objective world which
is in its simplest phases the occasion of their feeling, and in its
most complex manifestations the content of their knowledge.
If now it can be shown that the psychic states and conse-
quently the actions of an individual living in a society are
governed as much by his knowledge and ideas of what we
have called formations, as by his knowledge and experience
of the outer physical world, or of the concrete men with
whom he comes into contact, the criticisms above mentioned
will have been sufficiently met.
If we pause to consider what the terms subject and object
themselves imply, we will find that they are both abstrac-
tions from a primary sense-content. The one always im-
plies the other, and it is only in thought that the two can
be separated at all. Thought as a relating and limiting
activity involves in its very essence abstraction. From this
point of view the external physical world is itself an
abstraction from sense-experience. It is object to the indi-
vidual subject who knows it. We must be careful not to
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confuse objectivity with materiality. Everything material
is objective, but the objective is not exhausted in the material.
For instance, when we make the psychic life of others or
our own past mental states the &dquo; object &dquo; of our thought,
these immaterial things are as truly objective to us as the
external physical world can possibly be. Now in order to
distinguish that which is ‘ ‘ real &dquo; from that which is merely
a projection of his own brain, the individual subject is accus-
tomed to appeal to the consensus of his fellow human beings.
By accepting that which is reported as objective by all as
the &dquo; real,&dquo; hallucination is weeded out and the individual
obtains a reliable basis for action. All of these points are
in full harmony with our claim to consider the social forma-
tion as objective, and to treat it as one of the elements on
which the action of the individual depends.
Empirically the objectivity and positive character of social
formations will hardly be denied. A law is objective enough
to the criminal who violates it or who contemplates its vio-
lation., A man deliberating as to whether he shall go into
a public bar for a drink of liquor is just as apt to have his
decision determined by reference to his code of social pro-
priety as to the physiological condition of his body. A busi-
ness man finding his success dependent on the adoption of
certain dishonorable practices common among his competi-
tors will swing into line despite the dictates of his conscience.
These cases do not need multiplication. The influence on
the actions of the individual men is plainly enough to be
seen.
It is however clear that social formations are by no means
taken into account in all the actions of individuals. In
actions from impulse and from habit, there is in the nature
of the case no such reference. It is only in the class of
actions which follow conscious calculations that the objective
formation is of importance. But it is just such action, basing
as it does in reason, that is distinctive of human beings, and
by means of which, as has already been pointed out, the
r I
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human group is differentiated from even the highest aggre-
gation of animals. The human being recognizes means as
dintinct from ends, and he alone among animals can compare
and weigh these means; and make them directly the objects
of his activities. In highly developed societies it is only by
this process, by consciously recognizing the social formations
and adapting himself to them, that the individual can main-
tain a successful existence.
After what has been said it seems hardly necessary to add
that the objectivity which has been posited of social forma-
tions does not carry with it in any sense the implication
of any initiative or autonomous character. The formation
has its effect and is an element for reasoning only so far as
it is a part of the knowledge content of the individual man.
The difference between it and the external physical world,
as far as our purposes go, is simply that it has its effect
merely as a representative state, while material objects must
at times be considered also in their immediate effects as sim-
ple presentations.
Taking these elements,-the impulses, psychic customs
and calculations of men, and the content of their knowledge,
consisting of the physical world, other individuals and
social formations,-we have next to indicate a few of the
main forms in which they must be combined to explain the
phenomena of social life. In any given problem, only a
part of these elements may occur, or be important enough to
merit special consideration.
These problems may be divided in the usual way into
genetic and static. The static theories seek to explain the
social relationships and interactions, under circumstances in
which the elements on which the reasoning is based, remain
practically unchanged. The genetic theories, on the other
hand, seek to show the development of these very elements,
and the changes which have been brought about in them in
the course of human history. It must be remembered that
r- - -1
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this division of the problems of society into genetic and
static is a purely logical one, and that it is made only for
purposes of convenience in treatment. In a certain sense
all social problems may be looked on as genetic, as will
appear especially when we glance at the elements which are
used in the theories of value. Nevertheless, the distinction
is found to be of considerable importance. Let us examine,
first of all, the combination of the elements for the explana-
tion of a few typical genetic problems.
We have seen how in small, primary groups, brought to-
gether largely by conditions of food-supply and by sexual
impulses, the direct interaction of one individual upon
another through imitation will produce common habits, or
as we have called them customary actions. To explain
this process the only elements which we have found it
necessary to take into account are impulses, physical
nature, and the presence of other individuals. In this
way simple language forms are produced; so also primitive
religious beliefs, which are to be looked on as a customary
interpretation of certain physical phenomena. The same
elements will suffice to explain the origin of many of the
primitive formations implying division of labor; as simple
political institutions and ceremonial of worship, the fore-
runner of the organized church. It is true that the presence
of different groups of men in the same region has undoubt-
edly the utmost importance for the understanding of even
the earliest political institutions, as Gumplowicz has espe-
cially emphasized: but, as will appear later, this fact does
not make it necessary to assume the group as the unit of
reasoning.
Each new individual born or adopted into the group re-
ceives by imitation, conscious or unconscious, the customs
of the older members. Even after the custom has become
quite firmly fixed and well adapted for the ends which it
serves, a change in the environment will probably affect it
and gradually change its character.
I I
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These changes are usually brought about by repeated
slight deviations on the part of some of the more independ-
ent members of the group; and these deviations, imitated by
others, form the basis for the new custom. Sometimes,
again, a very firmly fixed customary action will survive on
the sudden removal to a different environment, and obtain
very different meaning from what it originally had.
It is clear that in some of these processes it has been
necessary to assume individuals acting with a more or less
perfect, conscious estimation of pleasures and pains; while
reaction is also beginning to be made with reference to the
formations objectively considered. One stage in the develop-
ment of the formation has thus served as a stepping-stone
on which the members of the society have risen to a higher
stage; or one formation has served as stepping-stone in the
change to another. To use another figure, the objectified
formation has served as the fulcrum on which the lever of
human desire has worked to secure a better adjustment to
the environment for the future.
In these ways then very complex customs and institutions
will gradually be_developed. It is usual to put in opposition
to one another two forms of the development of institutions;
on the one side, spontaneous or organic growth; on the
other, deliberate creation by a consciously acting govern-
ment or populace. We have made little of this distinction
in this paper because it is impossible to find any sharp line
of demarcation between the two forms of 
.growth. Both
conscious volitional action and reliance on custom play a
part in the development of every more complicated forma-
tion, and it is often impossible in any one case to decide on
the share of each element. The main characteristic of the
deliberate creation of institutions is probably that many peo-
ple-in democratic societies, presumably the majority-act to-
gether, and ordain that which seems fitting to them. But it is
evident that such action itself bases on an institution that is
ultimately of &dquo; customary &dquo; origin; w·hile we have shown
 at NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIV on April 22, 2015ann.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
I09
that even in the development of custom, consciously calcu-
lating action, though it may be only of a few people at a
time, plays a great part. The deliberating action of the
members of a modem political majority is only the extension
of the deliberating action which was in early societies con-
fined to the few, and the results of which were passed on to
the more passive part of the community by means of imita-
tion. The institution on the basis of which the modern
majority acts, is similarly only the outcome of a customary
formation. A deliberately produced formation, such as a
law, has, it is true, usually a sharply defined beginning and
end, and in so far differs from the customary formation; but,
on the other hand, its character is seen frequently to ap-
proximate that of the latter, inasmuch as its results are
often far different from what had been planned by those who
took part in its creation.
This is not the place to carry out in detail these considera-
tions ; but it has been made sufficiently clear how such
changes in form of the social interactions and relationships
of men must be explained. The elements of explanation
must all be based on the characteristics of the minds of indi-
vidual men. Individuals acting with reference to their total
environment, their knowledge of men, and nature, and
social organization, furnish us the materials from which we
can build up the genetic interpretation of society. Not that
the student of society aims primarily to determine how these
changes of character in the individual are produced. That is
clearly the affair of the psychologist. The sociologist assumes
rather such changes as facts through the aid of which he will
be enabled to explain the changing character of social life.*
* These considerations make it clear why it is that the emphasis throughout
this paper has been on the importance of the individual man’s characteristics for
the understandingof society, rather than vice versa. The whole of the phenomena
which we have had under discussion could have been approached equally well
from the other point of view, in which the centre of interest is the individual, and
society is considered only in so far as it is an important part of the environtnent
affecting its growth. Such a point of view is however taken, as has already been
said, rather by the psychologist and the moralist, than by the student of society.
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Let us pass now to an equally brief consideration of the
elements of investigation as they are combined for the expla-
nation of some of the static problems of society.
Static theories are conceivable which concern themselves
with almost any social formation and in almost any stage of
society. Besides theories of the development of language
and the marriage institution, of the state and of legal enact-
ments, we may have theories of the processes that go on in
any given society between the different individuals acting
with reference to the given formation. So a theory of thought
and its communication between individuals recognizing the
same language-formation is possible. The static theory of
marriage would trace the effects of the existence of the mar-
riage laws and customs on the actions of individuals, both
married and unmarried, taking into account at the same
time the physiological characteristics of the individuals and
the climatic conditions under which they lived, and also the
existence of the other social formations of the same society.
Undoubtedly the most important static theories are those
of modem industrial activities. They have concern with
the relationships of men, acting partially under the influence
of custom, partially by means of careful calculations of incre-
ments of pleasure and pain; these actions taking place under
definite geographical and climatic conditions, and with refer-
ence to definite industrial formations. Some of these forma-
tions have been already enumerated. They include organized
markets, credit, currency and banking systems, exchange
and the transportation system, and business law. In addi-
tion to these and many other strictly industrial formations,
the wide extent and complexity of our economic activities
require us to take into account nearly all of the more im-
portant social formations. It is sufficiently evident how
much a man’s industrial life is affected by the existence of
the state, even where it does not primarily conserve eco-
nomic ends; or by his desire to found a family or to conform
to some class spirit or to some demand of fashion or of his
r -&dquo; z
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&dquo; set &dquo; in society, simply for social reasons and where the
practice itself has no attraction for him.
It is evident that theories built up from these elements will
have validity only in the specific societies or countries in
which the particular premises used are found. They will
make no pretence of &dquo; perpetualism &dquo; or &dquo; ‘ cosmopolitanism. &dquo;
No theories of political economy, however general or uni-
versal they may have claimed to be, have been constructed
without reference to specific industrial formations. The
&dquo; absolutism &dquo; can consist only in choosing as premises such
formations as are common to as many societies as possible;
and in so doing the theory evidently moves far away from
the actual conditions of any one society.
The phenomena of market values furnish material for one
of the main static theories of industrial society. The theo-
ries advanced in their explanation base, in accordance with
what has just been said, on the existent industrial forma-
tions. Each industrial member of society takes these forma-
tions consciously into account, especially when he seeks to
change or better his condition, and he determines his action
with reference to them. The specific wants of the commu-
nity can be estimated by the business man and taken into
account in much the same way.
On the side of the consumer, the goods he desires are deter-
mined partly by custom, partly by his conscious estimation
of utilities; these factors both being modified to some extent
by the amount he is able to expend. On the side of the
entrepreneur, conscious calculations have largely replaced
customary production. The probable wants of the con-
sumers are estimated in connection with the possibilities of
supply under the given physical condition of the Territory,
and in connection with the probable supply from other pro-
ducers of the same good. On the side of the laborers custom
and calculation play very unequal parts in the different
countries and in the different branches of production. While
custom leads to a condition in which many individuals can
I I
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be lumped together, so to speak, and treated as a whole for
the purpose in hand, calculation leads more often to similar
types of action in many individuals, and so results in com-
petition. How ever far freedom of competition may have
advanced in modern society, it is very clear that a very
great part of the activities of men in society still rests on
custom, as well in the industrial field as in other departments
of social life, and that the conscious calculus of pleasures
and pains is by no means the only thing to consider in the
interpretation of these activities.
It ~is by these elements as above described, combined with
many other less important ones which cannot be mentioned
here, that market valuations and prices are produced in the
advanced modern society.*
All the illustrations of the synthesis of the different social
elements, which have thus far been given, deal, it will be
noticed, with the phenomena that take place inside of a
social group. It remains to indicate that even in the inter-
actions between different groups it is by no means necessary
to make the groups themselves the units of investigation.
Similar conditions excited in different individuals under the
same stimulus from members of another group, imitation of
these feelings through sympathy, and the transfer of them to
children and newcomers are sufficient to account for the ap-
parent action of the group as a unit. Impulse and custom
and calculation on the part of individuals are the true ele-
ments, not groups of men. The same elements are sufficient
to explain a popular uprising in a large modern state; or the
declaration of war by one state upon another. In this last
* This does not do violence to the fact that in many parts of the world prices are
still themselves matters of direct custom, in which case their discussion would
fall under the problems which we have called genetic rather than under the static
problems. It is necessary to point out again that this distinction of static and
genetic problems is purely one of convenience, and that from a broader point of
view all determinations of market values, implying, as they do, changes in the
opinions of individuals, have a certain dynamic character. From this point of
view all prices determined under the sway of free competition, however fluctuat-
ing they be, are themselves, as long as they last, true social formations.
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case, the process consists in the creation of common opinion
among the populace by imitation and reflection on the part
of individuals, and the conscious deliberation by the mem-
bers of the government with reference both to this public
opinion and to the foreign offending society.
We see then that in all departments of social life the main
elements to be considered are the actions of men in accord-
ance with custom and those which depend on deliberate cal-
culation. The latter must have, to a great extent, conscious
reference to the objectified customs and institutions of the
society in which the individual is placed, in short, to social
formations. These formations are on the one side social
products to be explained; on the other as part of the content
of knowledge of the individual, they are themselves elements
of further progress. Taken in the former way, we may
have for each one a genetic theory, an explanation of its de-
velopment. Wherever taken consciously into account by the
individual and where the phenomena are important, static
theories of them are necessary in the sense defined above.
From either point of view, by means of the formation or of
a group of formations, we are able to mark out a distinct
field for a separate social science. Such a science will not be
an abstract science of the nature of the pure economics,
about which much has been said recently; nor on the other
hand will it be merely a descriptive science of social pro-
ducts. It will be in the fullest sense explanatory through
a synthesis of the social elements which are grounded ulti-
mately in psychology. It is only through the combined
results of many such sciences thqt we will succeed in ad-
vancing on the one side to a better art of social control, on
the other, to a more perfect social philosophy; two goals
which are in truth much the same, looking but the opposite
ways along the stream of time.
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